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Introduction
This paper combines the problem of optimal income taxation with the freerider problem in public good provision. An optimal income tax is based on the utilitarian desire to redistribute resources in favor of the less able. An optimal solution of the free-rider problem has the property that a public good is installed if and only if the aggregate valuation in the economy is 1 sufficiently high. The present paper studies the interaction between these problems. It arises because expenditures on public goods and on income transfers are linked through a public sector budget constraint. That is, they compete for the same funds. Consequently, an individual's view on the desirability of public good provision will depend on the way he is treated by the transfer system. To illustrate this, consider a "welfare state", which allocates a lot of resources to a transfer system. Obviously, the beneficiaries of this system are individuals with a rather low level of income. Suppose that the magnitude of the transfer system depends on the level of public good provision. That is, whenever tax revenues are used for a public good, there are less funds left for transfers. Now consider asking a person with a high income about her views on using public money for a certain project, say a highway or an opera building. As she has a high income and does not receive transfers, she will be inclined to exaggerate when asked about the desirability of public good provision. Likewise, an individual with a low level of income tends to understate the desirability of public good provision because he fears a reduction of income transfers. The difficulty in finding an optimal mechanism for both redistribution and public good provision is that there are two incentive problems simultaneously. The first one is familiar from the theory of optimal income taxation and is due to the fact that individuals have private information on their earning abilities. This imposes incentive constraints on redistribution which give rise to what is known as the equity-efficiency tradeoff. 1 The second problem is the classical free-rider problem, which arises because individuals have private information on their valuation of a non-excludable public good. The main insight from the joint analysis of these two incentive problems is that the equity-efficiency tradeoff and the free-rider problem interact in a systematic fashion. More able individuals can have an excessive desire for public good provision, which they value as an instrument to limit the extent of redistribution. Likewise, less able individuals may tend to understate the desirability of provision in order to avoid a cut of transfers. Hence, a decision on provision that reflects the "true" aggregate valuation of the public good necessitates an adjustment of the transfer system that corrects these biases. This requires a complementarity between the level of redistribution and the decision on public good provision, relative to an equity-efficiency tradeoff without a free-rider problem: To prevent the more productive class from exaggerating, public good provision has to be accompanied by an increased level of redistribution. Similarly, the less productive are prevented from understating their valuation of the public good by a reduced level of redistribution if there is no public good provision.
The model that is used to arrive at these results combines a screening problem with a problem of information aggregation and involves two dimensions of individual heterogeneity, earning abilities as well as preferences for the public good. More precisely, the following assumptions are made. Individuals either have a low or a high level of earning ability. 2 Likewise, valuations of the public good are either high or low. Moreover, public goods preferences are assumed to be perfectly correlated with earning ability. That is, all individuals with the same level of earning ability also have the same valuation of the public good. With this specific information structure, the screening problem is to identify which individual has been assigned which level of earning ability. The problem of information aggregation is the elicitation of the public goods preferences of high and low ability individuals, respectively. 3 As is standard in the literature on optimal income taxation, the present paper assumes that there is a continuum of agents. While this assumption has a variety of convenient implications, it creates a difficulty when trying to discuss problems of information aggregation under incentive constraints. One might argue that, in a large economy, free-rider problems do not arise as a single individual has no impact on public good provision and hence no reason to hide his true valuation. However, the present paper takes a different view, based on the observation that, in a continuum economy, collective behavior of individuals has an impact on the perceived aggregate valuation of the public good. Indeed as will be shown below, allocation rules based on income tax schedules are vulnerable to coordinated manipulations by large groups of agents. The notion of a collectively incentive compatible income tax is introduced to deal with this issue. It specifies collective incentive conditions that ensure that information aggregation may proceed even under the threat of manipulative collective behavior. 4 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the environment. As a benchmark, Section 3 derives the optimal income taxation without a free-rider problem. Section 4 contains the definition of a collectively incentive compatible income tax. In section 5 the optimal collectively incentive compatible income tax is characterized. The last section contains concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
The environment
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals j ∈ I := [0, 1]. An individual has a pair of characteristics (w j , θ j ), where w j is a productivity parameter and θ j is a taste parameter for a public good. w j and θ j are taken to be the realizations of the binary random variablesw j andθ j , respectively. The possible values w 1 , w 2 ofw j and θ L , θ H ofθ j are taken to be the same for all j. Without loss of generality, w 1 < w 2 and θ L < θ H . The random variablesw j , j ∈ I, are assumed to satisfy a Law of Large Numbers for large economies: 5 while each individual has probability 1/2 for a high or a low productivity realization, this uncertainty about productivity parameters disappears in the aggregate. Ex post, after the realization of individual uncertainty, there are equal shares of more and less productive individuals in the population. For brevity, I refer to those individuals, who end up with the low productivity parameter w 1 , as class 1 individuals. Likewise, the individuals with productivity parameter w 2 are called class 2 individuals. The random variablesθ j , j ∈ I, are assumed to be perfectly correlated among all individuals with the same productivity parameter, i.e. ex post all individuals of class t, t ∈ {1, 2}, have the same taste parameter. Let θ t be the common value of the taste parameterθ j for all individuals j with w j = w t . The taste parameters θ 1 and θ 2 are the realizations of random variables θ 1 andθ 2 . The economy as a whole is subject to uncertainty about these random variables. There are four possibilities, or states, denoted by s LL , s LH ,s HL and s HH , where, e.g.
The set of states is written as S = {s LL , s LH , s HL , s HH }. All individuals of type t have the same utility function, which takes the form
(1)
C denotes consumption of private goods and Y = Lw t denotes effective labor or income. That is, w t can be interpreted as a wage rate and L denotes hours worked to generate income Y . Obviously, to achieve a given income Y individuals with a lower wage have to work more. Q ∈ {0, 1} stands for a public project, which is either installed or not. The functions u and v are strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable. Moreover, u is concave and v is convex. In addition, those functions satisfy the following boundary condition, which ensures interior solutions to optimization problems: for all w t and all C > 0, there exists Y > 0, such that
5 For a formal discussion, see Judd (1985) or Al-Najjar (2004) .
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Finally, note that preferences satisfy the single crossing condition with respect to the productivity parameter. Accordingly, at any point in the Y-C plane, the indifference curve of a less productive individual is steeper.
Information Structures
Throughout the analysis, I assume that the parameter values w 1 , w 2 , θ L and θ H are common knowledge. In contrast, the assignment of any one individual to the more or less productive class is that individual's private information. This privacy of information gives rise to assignment uncertainty. Further, I distinguish between two model specifications according to whether the realizations ofθ 1 andθ 2 are common knowledge. The model has pure assignment uncertainty if these realizations, and hence the state of the world s ∈ S, are commonly known. The model exhibits private information on taste parameters if only individuals of class t observe wetherθ t = θ L orθ t = θ H . In the latter case, in addition to the uncertainty regarding individuals' class assignments, there is aggregate uncertainty with respect to unknown class characteristics.
Anonymous Allocations and Income Tax Mechanisms
The analysis of admissible allocations is treated as a problem of mechanism design. Attention is restricted to the class of anonymous allocation mechanisms which are individually incentive compatible and feasible. In particular, this class of allocation mechanisms is flexible enough to deal with both information structures. An anonymous allocation mechanism specifies for each state s ∈ S a public good provision level Q(s) and for each characteristic in (w, θ) ∈ Γ := {w 1 , w 2 } × {θ L , θ H } a consumption level C(w, θ, s) and an output requirement Y (w, θ, s). An anonymous allocation mechanism is individually incentive compatible (I-IC) if ∀s ∈ S, ∀(w, θ) ∈ Γ and ∀(ŵ,θ) ∈ Γ,
An anonymous allocation mechanism is feasible if ∀s ∈ S, ∀(w, θ) ∈ Γ r (s),
where k denotes the cost of public good provision and Γ r (s) the set of individual characteristics supported in state s, e.g.
Some explanatory remarks are in order. The I-IC constraints specify incentives on the individual level. As the economy is large, those constraints are stated for a given state s. This reflects the fact that, in a large economy, no single individual is able to influence the state of the world as perceived by the mechanism designer. In particular, no individual has a noticeable impact on public good provision. If the information structure exhibits private information on taste parameters, then the tax setting institution has to deduce the actual state from individual reports. That is, the mechanism designer receives from each individual a statement which consists of an announced earning ability level and an announced taste parameter. An evaluation of all individual reports makes it possible to observe whether the less (more) able individuals have a low or a high taste parameter. The fact that s can not be taken as given explains why the message set in the revelation game equals Γ. However, if the analysis is concerned with pure assignment uncertainty, the message set Γ r (s) is sufficient. 6
The I-IC conditions require that truth-telling constitutes an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies. 7 That is, truth-telling has to be a best-response from an individual's perspective, irrespective of the announcements of others and irrespective of the actual state of the world. However, the I-IC conditions specify individual incentives only in response to message profiles that indicate a feasible state of the economy. A complete description of the revelation game also requires a specification of what happens if this distribution is incompatible with what is commonly known about the set S. These out-off-equilibrium payoffs have to preserve the incentive structure, i.e. they have to be such that truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy. This is, for instance, achieved by choosing Q = 0 and a degenerate consumption-income menu that contains only one C-Y -combination. The final remark clarifies why the set of anonymous, feasible and I-IC allocation mechanisms is of relevance for an analysis of income tax systems. To this end, call an anonymous allocation mechanism an income tax mechanism if there exists a function T : R + × S → R such that ∀(w, θ) ∈ Γ, ∀s ∈ S:
and, moreover, such that ∀s ∈ S and (w 1 , θ 1 ), (w 2 , θ 2 ) ∈ Γ r (s),
As has been shown by Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995) , the set of income tax mechanisms can be equivalently analyzed via the set of I-IC and feasible allocation mechanisms. Formally, one has the following result: An anonymous allocation mechanism is I-IC and feasible if and only if it is an income tax mechanism.
The following lemma provides an alternative characterization of income tax mechanisms which proves helpful in subsequent sections.
Lemma 1 An anonymous allocation mechanism is an income tax mechanism if and only if it is feasible and possesses the following properties:
i) No discrimination of taste in terms of utility (NDT-U): ∀s ∈ S, ∀w ∈ {w 1 , w 2 }, ∀θ ∈ {θ L , θ H } and ∀θ ′ ∈ {θ L , θ H },
ii) Individual revelation of productivity (I-RP): ∀s ∈ S, ∀θ ∈ {θ L , θ H }, ∀t ∈ {1, 2} and t = t ′ ,
The lemma follows from the fact that individuals take the state s and hence the level of public good provision as given. Due to the additive separability of preferences, this implies that individual incentive conditions become independent of taste parameters. Consequently, an income tax mechanism can use only individual differences in productivity as a screening device.
Pure assignment uncertainty
Contributions to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation are typically concerned with the case of pure assignment uncertainty. This section recalls results from this literature for the special setup of a two-class economy and derives a further comparative statics property. This provides a benchmark case, that proves helpful for the analysis of an information structure with private information on taste parameters in later sections.
The optimization problem
Under pure assignment uncertainty the state s of the economy is commonly known. Equivalently, for each taste parameterθ t , t ∈ {1, 2}, it is commonly known whether the realization θ t equals θ L or θ H . Consequently, assignment uncertainty stems only from the fact that each individual i has private information on whether her productivity parameter equals w 1 or w 2 . This considerably simplifies the analysis of anonymous allocation mechanisms. Once individual productivity is revealed, an individual's class assignment is known, and so is the individual's taste parameter. Hence, there is no need to specify C-Y pairs that depend on declared taste parameters. For the remainder of this section, I may thus suppress the dependence on taste parameters and write C t (s) and Y t (s) instead of C(w t , θ t , s) and Y (w t , θ t , s). Under pure assignment uncertainty, an income tax mechanism is a collection
which satisfies, for all s, the feasibility constraints
and the I-RP constraints
Note that, under pure assignment uncertainty, the NDT-U property is moot. There is no need to specify a C-Y pair for individuals who claim a "wrong" taste parameter. The "true" taste parameter is known anyway once an individual's productivity level is revealed. In state s, an income tax mechanism generates a utilitarian welfare level, which is, in the following, written as
.
Under pure assignment uncertainty, the state s is commonly known. Hence, it might seem natural to define an optimal utilitarian income tax mechanism such that, for given s, W (s) is maximized subject to the feasibility constraints in (2) and the I-RP constraints in (3). I will, however, proceed differently. Below a definition is stated which yields trivially the same set of optimal allocations, but facilitates a comparison to the case of private information on taste parameters discussed in later sections. An income tax mechanism is evaluated from an ex ante perspective, which is defined as a hypothetical situation where the actual state s is not yet known. That is, the objective function is a weighted average of the welfare levels in {W (s)} s∈S , with a probability weight attached to each state s. These probability weights are taken to be the prior beliefs of the tax setting planner who perceives the actual state s of the economy as the realization of a random variables. 
Definition 1 Under pure assignment uncertainty, an optimal income tax mechanism solves the problem of choosing {Q(s), Y 1 (s), C 1 (s), Y 2 (s), C 2 (s)} s∈S in order to maximize EW subject to the feasibility constraints in (2) and the I-RP constraints in (3).
For brevity, I refer to this optimal income tax problem under pure assignment uncertainty as the informed problem and to its solution as the informed optimum.
Characterizing the informed optimum
For a characterization of the informed optimum, it is helpful to introduce the following auxiliary problem, which does not include a public good but instead an exogenous revenue requirement r ≥ 0 in the budget constraint.
A solution to problem (4) is parameterized by the revenue requirement r and
The following result is well known (see e.g. Stiglitz (1982) ).
Lemma 2 At a solution to problem (4) the feasibility constraint and only the I-RP constraint for t = 2 are binding, implying that there is a distortion at the bottom and no distortion at the top:
Intuitively, problem (4) is essentially a problem of redistribution under incentive constraints. As the more productive suffer less from the necessity to generate income, a utilitarian planner wants them to work harder. This implies a binding I-RP constraint for this class of individuals at the informed optimum. The informed optimum is now characterized with reference to problem (4). I use a shorthand notation for the utility level at a solution to problem (4) induces for type t individuals: 8
Obviously, the informed utilitarian planner decides on public good provision according to the following criterion: Q(s) = 1 if and only if
Under this criterion, the provision rule chosen by an informed planner depends on the parameter values θ L and θ H . E.g. if
then an informed planner chooses Q(s) = 1 for all s. To avoid a lengthy discussion of each conceivable parameter constellation, I focus on a particular case.
Assumption 1 An informed planner chooses to install the public good in all states except state s LL : 9
For ease of reference, I denote by Q i : Q = 0 ⇐⇒ s = s LL the provision rule chosen by an informed planner. To complete the description of the informed optimum, I denote by U i 1 (s) and U i 2 (s) the realized utility levels of class 1 and class 2 individuals. Obviously,
I refer to the expression R t (0)−R t (k) as the utility loss of class t from paying for public good provision at the informed optimum. Moreover, I say that for class t individuals, the willingness to pay for the public good is positive (negative) if the utility gain θ t exceeds (falls short of) this utility loss, i.e. if
Conflicting interests at the informed optimum
Even though an optimal utilitarian income tax attaches equal weight to the utility levels realized by the more and the less able class of individuals, the informed optimum may give rise to conflicting views on the desirability of public good provision. To illustrate this, suppose for the sake of concreteness that
In this scenario, for the more productive individuals, the utility loss is so small that their willingness to pay for the public good is positive in all states s. By contrast, the less productive suffer so severely from the increased revenue requirement if the public good is installed that they oppose provision in every state of the world. A clarification of the possible patterns of conflicting interests will be important for an understanding of the additional incentive problems that come into play under an information structure with private information on taste parameters. Intuitively, if the scenario characterized by the inequalities in (5) arises, less productive individuals want to prevent the public good from being installed in every state s, and hence they have an incentive to report a low taste realization even if in fact their taste parameter is high. Likewise, the more able class wants to get the public good in every state and might be tempted to report a high taste in case of a low taste realization. The following lemma is important for an understanding of possible scenarios of conflicting interests. It shows that for the less productive class of individuals the utility loss is larger if in problem (4) the revenue requirement r is increased. In more technical terms, the lemma establishes a property of decreasing differences according to which a lower productivity level translates into a larger utility loss. The proof relies on the following assumption:
Assumption 2 The function v is strictly convex and satisfies 10 ∀x ≥ 0 :
Lemma 3 Let v(·) satisfy Assumption 2. Let r ′ > r. Then:
The intuition behind this observation is as follows: Consider a solution to problem (4) and suppose the revenue requirement is slightly increased.
The more productive cannot be forced to cover the resulting small budget deficit, as this would violate their I-RP constraint. To the contrary, less able individuals can be made worse off without violating any constraint. Consequently, the planner has to make them worse off if there is a need to extract larger revenues.
Possible scenarios of conflicting interests
If combined with the observation that the utility loss is larger for less able individuals, as shown in lemma 3, assumption 1 implies that the willingness of less able individuals to pay is negative if θ 1 = θ L . Analogously, for the more productive class, the willingness to pay is positive if θ 2 = θ H ,
These inequalities in conjunction with assumption 1 reduce the set of possible parameter constellations. The following three scenarios may arise.
These inequalities are interpreted as follows. Scenario 1: For individuals of any class t, willingness to pay for the public good is positive if the taste realization is high,θ t = θ H , and is negative if the taste realization is low,θ t = θ L . Scenario 1 hence gives rise to the statement that, at the informed optimum, willingness to pay for the public good is independent of earning ability. Scenario 2: For the less productive class, as under Scenario 1, the willingness to pay for the public good is positive only if the utility gain is high. In contrast, more productive individuals, whose utility loss is smaller, have a positive willingness to pay in any state s. Scenario 3: For more productive individuals, as under Scenario 2, the willingness to pay for the public good is always positive. In addition, less able individuals suffer from such a heavy utility loss that their willingness to pay is negative in any state s.
top of the I-RP requirement.
To illustrate this, suppose Scenario 2 applies and ask whether the informed optimum is implementable. If one takes the view that individual incentives are enough, the answer is yes. As all individuals take the mechanism designer's perception of the actual state as outside their influence, no isolated individual has a reason to misreport her own taste parameter. However, if the informed optimum is implemented, the more productive individuals want to have the public good in all states of the world, that is, even if θ 2 = θ L . And moreover, if class 2 individuals are able to convince the utilitarian planner that their taste parameter is in fact high, they can ensure the provision of the public good. As the decision on provision is based on a revelation game, there is an obvious way to achieve this: a collective lie of all class 2 individuals on their taste parameter. These considerations highlight the following issues: First, with private information on taste parameters, a mechanism designer may not be able to detect a deviation from the truth by a subset of agents. If all class 2 individuals make the same announcementθ 2 , it is not possible to tell whether those individuals are jointly lying or are jointly telling the truth. Second, such a deviation may be beneficial for such a subset of agents. Third, it is not prevented by individual incentive compatibility. Given that all class 2 individuals lie about their taste parameter, there is no incentive for an isolated class 2 individual to reveal the realization ofθ 2 truthfully. Due to the NDT-U property of income tax mechanisms, this is a systematic feature. A collective deviation involving taste parameters is not undermined by individual incentives.
Collective Incentive Compatibility
In the following a collectively incentive compatible (C-IC) income tax mechanism is defined. Such a mechanism ensures that truth-telling is an equilibrium outcome even under the threat of collective manipulations. Denote by J the set of measurable subsets of the set of agents, I = [0, 1], with positive length. A typical element is denoted J. Denote the true profile of characteristics in J by γ J := {(w j , θ j )} j∈J . Denote the reported profile
Denote the cross-section distribution of announcements induced byγ J if the true state of the economy is s ∈ S and all individuals not in J report truthfully by δ(γ J , s). Note that any such distribution belongs to the set ∆(Γ) of probability distributions on Γ = {w 1 , w 2 } × {θ L , θ H }, i.e. it assigns a probability weight to each of the four elements of Γ.
HH } the set of cross-section distributions of characteristics which correspond in an obvious way to the possible states of the world, e.g. d LH is a distribution which assigns equal mass to the elements of Γ r (s
Definition 2 A coalition J is said to manipulate an income tax mechanism if there exists s ∈ S andγ J = γ J with the following properties:
ii) Unanimity. All coalition members are strictly better off when choosing to report according toγ J instead of γ J . ∀j ∈ J:
iii) Individual Stability. No coalition member departs -unilaterally -from coalitional behavior. Given the I-IC -constraints, this requires, ∀j ∈ J:
iv) Collective Stability. There does not exist a subcoalition K ⊂ J, with an undetectable collective deviationγ K =γ K that induces a state perceptionŝ(γ K ,γ J\K , s) that makes all members of K strictly better off relative toŝ(γ J , s) (unanimity), prescribes for all its members individually best responses given the state perceptionŝ(γ K ,γ J\K , s) (individual stability) and is not threatened by further collective manipulations, which satisfy all these requirements (collective stability).
An income tax mechanism is said to be collectively incentive compatible (C-IC) if there exists no manipulating coalition.
According to this definition, a coalition considers a collective deviation in response to truth-telling of all other individuals. The scope for manipulation is limited by the requirement that it must not be detectable, i.e. the relevant coalitional plans are only those for which it does not become apparent that a manipulation has occurred. Moreover, coalition members have to agree unanimously on a deviation and may not use side payments to reach such an agreement. Finally, a coalition has to meet two stability requirements. The incentives coalition members face individually must not conflict with the message profile used by the coalition; that is, collective manipulations are a concern only in so far as they do not conflict with I-IC. In addition, a conceivable collective manipulation must not provoke the formation of a subcoalition which departs from the original coalitional plan. These stability requirements have been introduced by in their definition of a coalition-proof Nash-equilibrium. A peculiarity of Definition 2 is that the collective stability of a coalition J is defined with reference to the collective stability of a coalition K ⊂ J. Obviously, in a continuum economy, there is no chance of tracing these notions back to the collective stability of some "smallest" coalitions. As will become clear (see Proposition 1), for the purposes of this paper, this does not create a problem. The structure of a two-class economy is sufficiently simple to arrive at a complete characterization of C-IC income tax mechanisms. With reference to the literature, different interpretations of the implicit assumptions on coalition formation can be given. First, suppose that pre-play communication resolves the uncertainty among individuals about the actual state of the economy. 11 The above definition then requires that truth-telling is a best response from the perspective of a coalition whose members know the true state of the world and presume that all individuals outside the coalition tell the truth. Alternatively, C-IC can be framed as a robustness-requirement. 12 It implies that ex post, after the state of the world has become commonly known, no subset of individuals would jointly want to revise their announcements if they were, hypothetically, given the opportunity to do so.
C-IC in the two-class economy
The definition of C-IC stated above is rather abstract in the sense that it excludes any kind of coalitional manipulation. This concern can be simplified by making use of the specific features of a two-class economy. As developed below, it suffices to exclude manipulative threats of coalitions, which consist of all individuals of one class. Moreover, individual and collective incentive concerns can be separated: the latter require that individuals belonging to the same class are prevented from a collective lie on their taste parameter, while the former ensure a revelation of productivity parameters.
Definition 3 A utility allocation specifies for every state s ∈ S, utility levelsŨ 1 (s) andŨ 2 (s) for type 1 and type 2 individuals, respectively. A utility allocation is said to be implementable if there exists a C-IC income tax mechanism such that ∀s ∈ S, and for all (w t , θ t ) ∈ Γ r (s),
where V t (s) is a shorthand for the utility class t individuals derive in state s from their consumption-income combination. A utility allocation {Ũ 1 (s),Ũ 2 (s)} s∈S is said to be Pareto-optimal if it is implementable and there does not exist some other implementable utility allocation {Ũ ′ 1 (s),Ũ ′ 2 (s)} s∈S which yields, in all states s and for all t ∈ {1, 2}, a weakly larger utility level,Ũ ′ t (s) ≥Ũ t (s), and in some state s and for some class t a strictly larger utility level,Ũ ′ t (s) >Ũ t (s).
Proposition 1 Suppose there is no pooling of earning ability, that is, ∀s ∈ S, ∀(
Then, a utility allocation is Pareto-optimal if and only if it is implementable by a feasible allocation mechanism which satisfies I-RP and the following properties:
i) Collective revelation of taste on the class level (C-RT-C): ∀x ∈ {L, H}, ∀x ∈ {L, H}, ∀y ∈ {L, H} and ∀ŷ ∈ {L, H}:
ii) No discrimination of taste in terms of consumption and income (NDT-CY): ∀s ∈ S, ∀w ∈ {w 1 , w 2 }, ∀θ ∈ {θ L , θ H } and ∀θ ′ ∈ {θ L , θ H },
The NDT-CY property requires that, for a given distribution of characteristics in the economy, the allocation of private goods is independent of taste parameters. This is a slightly stronger property as relative to NDT-U.
According to the C-RT-C -property, manipulations of coalitions consisting only of individuals with the same type and which misreport only the taste parameter are ruled out. Obviously, this condition is necessary for C-IC. Proposition 1 states that it is also sufficient if one restricts attention to Pareto-optimal allocations.
The proof proceeds as follows. First it is shown that there cannot be an undetectable collective manipulation that involves productivity parameters. This would require some type 1 individuals to be willing to claim a high productivity and some type 2 individuals to be willing to claim a low productivity. Due to the single-crossing property, this is not compatible with I-IC unless there is pooling. Then, it is observed that undetectability in a two-class economy requires all individuals who report the same productivity parameter to agree on the reported taste parameter as well. Hence, there remain only two kinds of collective manipulations: those where only the individuals of one class lie on their taste parameter and those where individuals of both classes jointly lie on their taste parameter. The former kind of collective manipulation is ruled out by the C-RT-C property. The latter would require that both classes prefer a different state perception. It is shown that this situation can not arise under a Pareto-optimal utility allocation. Proposition 1 justifies the restriction to allocation rules with the NDT-CY property. This implies that a more concise notation can be used. In the following, the consumption and income for an individual of type t, given that the state of the world is s, is written as (C t (s), Y t (s)), with the understanding that this pair equals both (C(w t , θ L , s), Y (w t , θ L , s)) and (C(w t , θ H , s), Y (w t , θ H , s)). The I-RP property is hence written in the following as ∀s ∈ S, ∀t, ∀t ′ = t,
The budget constraints now read as ∀s ∈ S,
The set of implementable allocation rules is represented in the remainder of the paper by the collections {Q(s), Y 1 (s), C 1 (s), Y 2 (s), C 2 (s)} s∈S , which satisfy the C-RT-C property, as well as the inequalities in (7) and (8). The optimal utilitarian income tax mechanism is now defined as follows.
Definition 4 With private information on taste parameters, the optimal C-IC income tax solves the problem of choosing {Q(s), Y 1 (s), C 1 (s), Y 2 (s), C 2 (s)} s∈S , subject to the C-RT-C constraint, the I-RP constraints in (7) and the feasibility constraints in (8), in order to maximize EW .
This optimization problem differs from the one analyzed in the previous section by the presence of the C-RT-C constraints. Under pure assignment uncertainty, there is no need to take collective incentives into account.
Optimality under Collective Incentives
In this section, the properties of an optimal C-IC income tax are derived for each scenario. This is achieved via a two step procedure. The first step solves for an optimal C-IC income tax, taking the provision rule for the public good as given. The second step determines the optimal provision rule. This approach is tractable because of the fact that the C-RT-C constraints limit the number of admissible provision rules.
Lemma 4 Under C-RT-C, provision rules are increasing in both arguments, ∀x ∈ {L, H} : Q(s xL ) ≤ Q(s xH ) and ∀y ∈ {L, H} : Q(s Ly ) ≤ Q(s Hy ).
The monotonicity constraints stated in the lemma imply that there are only six candidate provision rules. 14 The provision rule Q i : Q = 0 ⇐⇒ s = s LL , which is part of the informed optimum, satisfies these constraints. The same is true for provision rule Q i ′ , defined by Q = 1 ⇐⇒ s = s HH , provision rule Q 1 , which calls for public good provision if and only if class 1 individuals have a high taste parameter Q 1 : Q = 1 ⇐⇒ s ∈ {s HL , s HH }, and the analogously defined provision rule Q 2 : Q = 1 ⇐⇒ s ∈ {s LH , s HH }. Finally, the monotonicity constraints are trivially satisfied by the constant provision rules Q ≡ 0 and Q ≡ 1. One of these six candidate provision rules is taken as given when undertaking the first step. The subsequent analysis focuses on the problem of finding an optimal C-IC income tax that implements the informed planner's provision rule Q i . Formally, this problem is denoted Problem P i and defined as follows.
The optimal C-IC income tax under Q i : Problem P i
An optimal C-IC income tax which implements provision rule Q i solves the problem of choosing {Y 1 (s), C 1 (s), Y 2 (s), C 2 (s)} s∈S in order to maximize the expected welfare contribution from consumption and income requirements
subject to the C-RT-C constraints, 15
14 The lemma follows from standard arguments. See the appendix.
15 One arrives at the inequalities in (9) by plugging Q i into the C-RT-C constraints.
the I-RP constraints in (7) and the feasibility constraints
When does collective incentive compatibility matter?
With reference to problem P i , the Scenarios for which the informed optimum survives the introduction of collective incentive requirements are easily clarified. Recall that the informed optimum is obtained by maximizing EW V subject to I-RP and feasibility, without taking C-RT-C into account. Obviously, the informed optimum satisfies C-RT-C if and only if the statements in (9) remain true as one replaces V t (s) by R t (0) if s = s LL and by R t (k) if s = s LL . That is, the informed optimum satisfies C-RT-C if and only if
This statement coincides with the definition of Scenario 1, i.e. with a parameter constellation such that, at the informed optimum, "willingness to pay for the public good is independent of earning ability." These observations are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The informed optimum has the C-RT-C property if and only if Scenario 1 holds.
The informed optimum satisfies C-RT-C under Scenario 1 even though, for s = s LH and s = s HL , there are conflicting interests. One class of individuals -the one with the high taste parameter -wants to have the public good, while the other class opposes provision. However, this conflict does not cause collective incentive problems. The class with a high taste parameter behaves truthfully in order to ensure provision. Likewise, the class with a low taste wants to avoid provision and hence does not deviate from the truth. Under Scenarios 2 and 3, at least one of these properties is violated.
How to deviate from the informed optimum?
According to Proposition 2, under Scenarios 2 and 3 collective incentive problems force a deviation from the informed optimum. To understand the planner's assessment of conceivable deviations, a characterization of the I-RP constrained Pareto-frontier in a neighborhood of the informed optimum is needed. To this end, the following problem is considered.
I denote by P (V 2 , r) the utility level of class 1 individuals that is induced by solution to problem (12).
Lemma 5 Let v(·) satisfy Assumption 2.
i) For allV 2 and all r, Problem (12) has a unique solution. This solution is such that (BC) is binding and there is no distortion at the top.
ii) For all r, P is a continuous and strictly concave function ofV 2 with a unique maximum. ForV 2 = R 2 (r) -i.e. at the informed optimum -P is strictly decreasing inV 2 .
iii) For all r, there is a maximal valueR 2 (r) such that forV 2 <R 2 (r), (I-RP 2 ) is binding, implying a distortion at the bottom. ForV 2 > R 2 (r), (I-RP 2 ) is not binding, and there is no distortion at the bottom.
Part ii) of Lemma 5 shows that there is a well defined range of parameters such that there is indeed a tradeoff between the utility of the "rich" and the utility of the "poor". 16 Moreover the informed utilitarian optimum does not lie at the boundary of the region where the tradeoff prevails. That is, while the utilitarian planner expands redistribution up to a level that gives rise to incentive problems -recall that the informed optimum has a binding I-RP constraint for class 2 -she does not aim at the maximal level of incentive compatible redistribution.
Scenario 2
In the following, the optimal C-IC income tax for Scenario 2 is analyzed. First, Problem P i is solved. Then, the circumstances under which a utilitarian planner indeed wants to stick to provision rule Q i under C-RT-C constraints are clarified.
Under Scenario 2, C-RT-C of the informed optimum fails as the more productive want to induce public good provision even if θ 2 = θ L , i.e. the preferences of class 2 individuals cause a violation of the independence condition (11), and one may thus think of class 2 as the source of collective incentive problems. Proposition 3 characterizes the optimal utilitarian reaction to this problem.
Proposition 3 Let v(·) satisfy Assumption 2. Let the parameters θ L and θ H be such that Scenario 2 arises. There existsθ L such that if θ L ≤θ L , then a solution to Problem P i has the following properties:
For all s, V 1 (s) = P (V 2 (s), kQ i (s)), and there is a distortion at the bottom.
Under Scenario 2, the informed optimum is not achievable, as class 2 individuals have a positive willingness to pay for the public good in any state s.
As the utility loss from public good provision is not large enough, class two individuals will never admit a low taste realization. To prevent a collective deviation from truth-telling, the planner has to deviate from the informed optimum such that, from the perspective of the "rich" class, the utility loss from public good provision goes up. This requires an increase in the level of redistribution as compared to the informed optimum in states with public good provision and a reduction in the level of redistribution in states with non-provision. Hence, in state s LL , in which the public good is not installed, class 2 individuals receive a C-Y pair that generates a utility level above R 2 (0). In all other states, the public good is installed and class 2 gets a C-Y pair that implies a utility level below R 2 (k). These incentive corrections are chosen such that the deviation from the informed optimum is as small as possible in welfare terms. Consequently, the C-RT-C constraint
The deviations from the informed optimum proceed along the I-RP constrained Pareto frontier; that is, class 1 individuals are made as well off as possible, given the need to fix the collective incentive problem that stems from class 2 individuals. In particular, this implies that the less productive can be made better off relative to the informed optimum in states with public good provision. As class 2 individuals receive a utility level below R 2 (k), this leaves room to raise the utility of class 1 individuals above R 1 (k). Analogously, in states without public good provision, class 1 individuals are worse off. As the utility level of the "rich" class exceeds R 2 (0), a utility level of R 1 (0) is out of reach for the "poor" class.
The main reason why Proposition 3 requires θ L not to exceed some upper boundθ L , is the requirement that the C-RT-C constraints of the less productive individuals are not binding. 17 The correction of redistribution claimed by Proposition 3 implies that the utility difference V 1 (s LL )−V 1 (s HL ) shrinks relative to the informed optimum. If the parameter θ L is small, then there is enough room for such an adjustment. That is, the incentive corrections required to solve P i do not induce the less productive to prefer Q = 1 just in order to prevent the reduction of transfers that accompanies Q = 0. Figure 1 : The graph shows the I-RP constrained Pareto frontiers for the revenue requirements 0 and k, respectively. Under Sc. 2, the difference R 2 (0) − R 2 (k) is too small to satisfy C-RT-C for class 2. Under a modest incentive problem, the planner deviates to points A and B. Under a severe incentive problem, the vertical distance between these points is smaller than θ L .
These considerations suggest the following terminology for a characterization of collective incentive problems. If θ L ≤θ L , incentive problems are modest in the sense that it is possible to correct for the "original" collective incentive problem which stems from class 2 individuals, without creating a new one resulting from class 1 individuals. By contrast, collective incentive problems are called severe if a solution to P i has two binding C-RT-C constraints. Here, severity refers to the fact that the attempt to restore C-RT-C for one class of individuals, renders collective manipulations attractive for the other class.
Definition 5 Denote by {V * * 1 (s)} s∈S the utility levels realized by class 1 individuals at a solution to problem P i . Collective incentive problems under Scenario 2 are called modest if
Otherwise collective incentive problems under Scenario 2 are called severe.
Is Q i the optimal provision rule under C-RT-C constraints?
I now turn to the question whether a utilitarian planner who faces C-RT-C constraints indeed wants to implement provision rule Q i . Possibly, the welfare burden of having to adjust the transfer system if Q i is chosen is such that a different provision rule turns out to be superior, e.g. one alternative scheme is to install the public good in every state of the world Q(s) = 1 for all s ∈ S. While this provision rule has the disadvantage that resources are used to cover the cost of provision even if s = s LL , there is no need to ask individuals about their taste parameters. Hence, there is no need to deviate from the utility levels R 1 (k) and R 2 (k), which result from the informed optimum if the revenue requirement equals k. In case of a modest incentive problem, it depends on the planner's prior whether or not provision rule Q i is chosen. To see this, suppose first that p LL is very small. Then the provision rule Q ≡ 1 seems attractive, as the state in which a deviation from the informed optimum occurs is very unlikely, i.e. the smaller p LL , the more attractive provision rule Q ≡ 1 becomes in comparison to Q i . As the welfare assessment EW is continuous in the prior probabilities, there must exist prior probabilities for which Q ≡ 1 is superior. Now suppose that the parameters θ L and θ H are such that only a "small" deviation from the informed optimum is needed to achieve collective incentive compatibility -in terms of Figure 1 , the points A and B are very close to the informed optimum. In such a case, the adjustments of the transfer system, required under Q i , are negligible in welfare terms. Consequently, one may find priors such that this provision rule remains the optimal one. In contrast, under a severe incentive problem, Q i will not be chosen. To see this, suppose that the C-RT-C constraints
are both binding. The two binding incentive constraints imply that all individuals are indifferent between public good provision and non-provision if s = s LL , i.e. given {V 1 (s), V 2 (s)} s∈S , all individuals are indifferent between the provision rules Q i and Q ≡ 1. However, Q ≡ 1 avoids any departure from R 1 (k) and R 2 (k), implying that utilitarian welfare is higher in every state of the world. These considerations are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let v(·) satisfy Assumption 2. Let the parameters θ L and θ H be such that Scenario 2 arises. i) If collective incentive problems are modest, then there exist prior beliefs p such that Q i is part of an optimal C-IC income tax mechanism.
ii) If collective incentive problems are severe, then there do not exist prior beliefs such that Q i is part of an optimal C-IC income tax mechanism.
I do not discuss in more detail which of the six candidate provision rules may be supported by some prior beliefs as part of an optimal income tax mechanism. This would require for each of these candidate provision rules an analysis similar to the one conducted for Q i ; that is, one would have to determine, for each of them, the pattern of binding C-RT-C constraints and the welfare implications of those binding constraints.
The main results are summarized as follows: if provision rule Q i -or any other rule that makes the decision on provision dependent on the preferences of class 2 individuals -is chosen for implementation, the planner has to accept the necessity of excessive redistribution if the public good is installed, and suboptimal redistribution if not. This may imply that the planner prefers a different provision rule in order to limit the deviations from the allocation of private goods prescribed by the informed optimum.
Discussion of Scenario 3
For the sake of completeness, I briefly discuss how these considerations have to be modified under Scenario 3. Under this parameter constellation, at the informed optimum, class 1 individuals oppose public good provision in any state s and class 2 individuals desire provision in any state s, i.e. there are two sources of collective incentive problems. In order to ensure collective truth-telling of class 1, at a solution to Problem P i , the attractiveness of public good provision has to be increased relative to the informed optimum. Simultaneously for class 2, the attractiveness of public good provision has to be decreased. Fortunately, these incentive corrections tend to complement each other. To see this, recall the properties of a solution to Problem P i under Scenario 2, which was dealing only with the collective incentive problem for class 2 individuals. This solution deviates from the I-RP constrained Pareto frontiers for revenue requirements 0 and k, respectively, such that that the utility difference between provision and non-provision shrinks for class 1 individuals relative to the informed optimum, i.e. this incentive correction points in the right direction as it makes public good provision more attractive from the perspective of class 1. Hence, under Scenario 3 the solution of Problem P i may be such that the C-RT-C constraint for class 1 is not binding. In this case, the solution of Problem P i is again characterized by Proposition 3. More generally, one has to distinguish between modest and severe incentive problems. Collective incentive problems are modest if, at a solution to Problem P i , only the C-RT-C constraint for one class is binding. Otherwise they are called severe. These collective incentive problems may imply that Q i is not part of an optimal C-IC income tax mechanism.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis has shown that an optimal utilitarian income tax is robust to the introduction of a free-rider problem on public good provision if and only if "willingness to pay for the public good" is independent of earning ability. Otherwise, collective incentive considerations force a deviation from the optimal tax scheme. Such a deviation can take different forms, a modification of the provision rule, an adjustment of the private goods allocation accompanying a given provision rule or both. The exact pattern depends on the interaction of prior probabilities and the intensity of the collective incentive problem. This raises the question how to assess these deviations from a welfare perspective. As the analysis has shown, it is possible that those deviations make one class better off while hurting the other class, i.e. that they do not cause a departure from constrained efficiency. However, they place an additional welfare cost on redistribution if the allocation mechanism in addition has to achieve a surplus maximizing decision on public good provision. If the latter requires that, say, the "rich" admit a low valuation of public goods, then one can not simultaneously have an excessive level of redistribution in response to such a low valuation. Consequently, one has to tradeoff the utilitarian welfare gains from a more favorable solution of the equity-efficiency tradeoff with those from a more favorable solution of the free-rider problem. This tradeoff is solved such that a deviation from an optimal income tax, as typically defined in the literature, is desirable in order to improve the possibility to aggregate information on the willingness to pay for public goods.
To see that the numerator of α is negative as well, note that equation (13) implies:
Further,
The stated properties of α, β, γ, δ and ǫ imply that Claim 1 holds true. Claim 2.
Proof. Recall that at a solution of problem (4), the I-RP -constraint of the more productive type is binding (see equation (16)). Hence, it must be the case that:
Due to the convexity of v(·) and dY * 1 (r) dr > 0, one also has:
To see that also the first inequality holds, note that, using (15), one has:
This expression is strictly negative by Claim 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: Before proceeding with the proof, an additional piece of notation is introduced. Recall that an income tax mechanism specifies for each s the variables Q(s) and Proof. It is first shown that there is no coalition that contains individuals of both classes who both misreport productivity. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exist s ∈ S, J ∈ J , containing individuals of both types and δ(γ J , s) ∈ D such that individuals of both classes misreport productivity and such that ∀j ∈ J:
Evaluating this condition for both types and using the NDT-U property implies that for all t ∈ {1, 2},
Due to the single crossing property, those equalities hold for all t only if
Hence, this contradicts the assumption that there is no pooling. We may thus assume that all individuals of one class reveal their productivity parameter. But then non-detectability requires that all individuals of the other class reveal their productivity parameter as well. Otherwise the announced distribution would not be compatible with the commonly known fact that half of the population has earning ability w t ′ and half of the population has earning ability w t .
Claim 2. Consider an income tax mechanism M . Suppose there are no pooling outcomes. Suppose the induced utility allocation {Ũ 1 (s),Ũ 2 (s)} s∈S has the C-RT-C property. Then, there is no manipulating coalition that contains individuals of only one type.
Proof. Suppose all individuals of type t ′ reveal their characteristics truthfully. By Claim 1, all individuals of type t, t = t ′ reveal their earning ability truthfully. Moreover, all individuals of type t have to report the same taste parameter. Otherwise the announced distribution does not belong to D. Hence, any conceivable manipulation must involve a revelation of earning ability and a collective misreport of taste on the class level. Those manipulations are ruled, by the C-RT-C property.
Claim 3. Consider an income tax mechanism M = (A(s LL ), A(s LH ), A(s HL ), A(s HH )). Suppose there are no pooling outcomes. Suppose the induced utility allocation {Ũ 1 (s),Ũ 2 (s)} s∈S has the C-RT-C property and is Pareto-optimal within the set of utility allocations which are implementable by an income tax mechanism with the C-RT-C property. Then, there is no manipulating coalition that contains individuals of both types. Proof. By Claim 1, individuals of both types reveal their productivity parameters. By non-detectability, all individuals who announce the same productivity parameter also have to announce the same taste parameter. Hence, the only conceivable manipulation that contains individuals of both types is such that all type 1 individuals misreport θ 1 and all type 2 individuals misreport θ 2 . I show in the following, that Pareto-optimality within the set of C-RT-C utility allocations implies that there does not exist a stable joint manipulation of taste parameters that makes both type 1 and type 2 individuals strictly better off. 
Due to NDT-U, this collective deviation is individually stable, as it does only involve misreports of taste parameters. To achieve collective stability as well, the following C-RT-C constraints have to be binding,
otherwise a coalition consisting only of type 1 individuals or a coalition 18 The reasoning that follows is applicable for any conceivable constellation under which type 1 and type 2 individuals might consider a joint manipulation of taste parameters.
consisting only of type 2 individuals would want to deviate once more after the state perception s HH has been induced.
(a) Suppose that 
By (17), (18) and (20), the following income tax mechanism
The following income tax mechanism M ′ = (A(s HH ), A(s LH ), A(s HH ), A(s HH )) is Pareto superior. It follows from (17) that both types are better off in state s LL . It follows from (18) that type 2 is not worse off in state s HL , and it follows from (21) that type 1 is strictly better off in state s HL . Moreover, it is easily verified that M ′ satisfies all C-RT-C constraints.
Then, along the same lines as under (c), one shows that M ′ = (A(s HH ), A(s HH ), A(s HL ), A(s HH )) is Pareto superior and satisfies C-RT-C. Claims 1 to 3 are summarized as follows: Suppose there are no pooling outcomes. Then a utility allocation that is Pareto-optimal within the set of utility allocations which are implementable by an income tax mechanism with the C-RT-C property also possesses the (more demanding) C-IC property. We have thus shown that the set of Pareto-optimal utility allocations under C-IC income tax mechanisms coincides with the set of Pareto-optimal utility allocations under C-RT-C income tax mechanisms. In the following, I may hence focus on the latter set. Recalling Lemma 1, these utility allocations are achievable by means of a feasible allocation mechanism with the I-RP, the NDT-U and the C-RT-C property. The following claim remains to be established: Claim 4. If pooling can be excluded, a Pareto-optimal utility allocation is implementable if and only if it is implementable by a feasible allocation mechanism which satisfies the NDT-CY, the I-RP and the C-RT-C property. Proof. As the NDT-CY property implies the NDT-U property, the ifpart is trivial. To prove the only if-part, consider an implementable utility allocation and the underlying coalition-proof income tax mechanism Q(·), C(·), Y (·). Construct an allocation rule Q ′ (·), C ′ (·), Y ′ (·) which has the NDT-CY property and coincides with Q(·), C(·), Y (·) "on the equilibrium path" as follows:
is feasible and inherits the NDT-U, the I-RP and the C-RT-C -property from Q(·), C(·), Y (·).
Proof of Lemma 4:
Consider for example the C-RT-C constraints for class 1 given that θ 2 = θ L :
Adding up these inequalities gives Q(s HL ) ≥ Q(s LL ). Similarly, one derives the constraints Q(s LH ) ≥ Q(s LL ), Q(s HH ) ≥ Q(s HL ) and Q(s HH ) ≥ Q(s LH ).
Proof of Lemma 5:
The argument is only sketched. Consider the Lagrangean of problem (12):
Deriving first order conditions, one easily verifies that (BC) has to be binding, that there is no distortion at the top and a distortion at the bottom if and and only if (I-RP 2 ) is binding. Denote the solution of problem (12) by (Ȳ 1 (V 2 ),C 1 (V 2 ),Ȳ 2 (V 2 ),C 2 (V 2 )). Uniqueness of this solution can be established as follows. Strict quasiconcavity of preferences and the property of no distortion at the top uniquely determinē Y 2 andC 2 as a function ofV 2 . The fact that (BC) is binding yields a unique iso-tax-revenue line Y 1 − C 1 = γ, with γ = C 2 (V 2 ) − Y 2 (V 2 ) + r, on which the point (Ȳ 1 (V 2 ),C 1 (V 2 )) can be found. More precisely, (Ȳ 1 (V 2 ),C 1 (V 2 )) maximizes u(C 1 ) − v(Y 1 /w 1 ) subject to I-RP 2 and Y 1 − C 1 = γ. Again, due to strict quasiconcavity, the latter problem has a unique solution. Denote the optimal values of the multipliers at the solution of problem (12) byλ(V 2 ) andν(V 2 ). These multipliers are used to study how P depends on V 2 . The following property is used: 19 ∂P ∂V2 =λ(V 2 ) −ν(V 2 ) .
Similarly as for the proof of Lemma 3, comparative statics of the solution of problem (12) with respect toV 2 can be derived. Based on this exercise, the comparative statics of the Lagrangean multipliers can be determined. 20 The details of the computations are omitted. One arrives at the following results:
(a) Suppose first that (I-RP 2 ) is binding. 21 Using Assumption 2, one verifies that the functionλ(V 2 ) decreases inV 2 and that the function 19λ (R2) ≥ 0 captures the effect that a lower level ofV2 tends to reduce P due to a worsening of incentive problems. The expression −ν(V2) ≤ 0 shows that a lower level of V2 allows us to increase P as less resources are needed to equip type 2 individuals with a utility level ofV2.
20 The first order conditions imply:
where M RS1 := /u ′ (C1). 21 The existence of a valueV2 such that (I-RP2) is binding follows from Lemma 2. ν(V 2 ) increases inV 2 , i.e. as long as (I-RP 2 ) is binding the function P is strictly concave inV 2 and one has:
(b) Assume that (I-RP 2 ) is not binding. 22 The first order conditions implȳ λ(V 2 ) = 0 andν(V 2 ) = u ′ (C 1 )/u ′ (C 2 ). Again, the comparative statics with respect toV 2 reveal
(c) Asλ(V 2 ) decreases inV 2 , there is a critical valueR 2 , such that if this critical value is exceeded, (I-RP 2 ) is not binding anymore. Moreover, one can show that the functionλ(V 2 ) −ν(V 2 ) is continuous atR 2 .
(d) P has a maximum as follows from the existence of a solution of the following problem:
Denote byṼ 2 the utility level that results for type 2 individuals at a solution to problem (24). Using the first order conditions of problem (24) allows us to verify thatλ(Ṽ 2 ) −ν(Ṽ 2 ) = 0.
(e) Finally, use the first order condition (13) of the informed problem to substitute for u ′ (C 1 )/u ′ (C 2 ) in the formula forν(V 2 ) (see (23)), one getsλ(R 2 (r)) −ν(R 2 (r)) = −1.
Proof of Proposition 3: I consider a relaxed version of Problem P i , referred to as Problem P i x . P i x takes only a subset of the constraints of P i into account. I show below that a solution to P i x satisfies these neglected constraints. Formally P i x is defined as follows. Maximize EW V subject to the feasibility 22 The existence of a value ofV2 such that (I-RP2) is not binding can e.g. be established by the laissez faire solution, where individuals of type t choose (Yt, Ct) to maximize utility under the constraint Yt = Ct + k 2 . constraints in (10), the I-RP constraints for type 2 and the following subset of the C-RT-C constraints:
{V * * t,x (s)} s∈S denotes the utility levels realized by class t at a solution to P i x . The following assumption formalizes the statement in Proposition 3 that θ L must not exceed some upper boundθ L .
Assumption 3 θ L < min{R 2 (0) − R 2 (k), P (R 2 (k) + θ L , 0) − P (R 2 (0) − θ L , r)}.
As will become clear, θ L ≤R 2 (0) − R 2 (k) ensures that, in every state s, there is a distortion at the bottom at a solution of P i
x . θ L ≤ P (R 2 (k) + θ L , 0) − P (R 2 (0) − θ L , r) ensures that a solution of P i x does not violate the neglected C-RT-C constraint for class 1. 23 Under Assumption 3, Proposition 3 follows from the following observations.
(a) In every state s, the budget constraint is binding and there is no distortion at the top.
Proof. This follows from setting up the Lagrangean of P i x and deriving first order conditions.
(b) V * * 2,x (s LL ) ≤ θ L + R 2 (k). Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that V * * 2,x (s LL ) > θ L +R 2 (k). Then the planner could choose, instead, the allocation (Y * 1 (k), C * 1 (k), Y * 2 (k), C * 2 (k)) for s = s LL . For s = s LL , the planner could choose V * * 2,x (s LL ) = θ L + R 2 (k) and V 1 = P (θ L + R 2 (k), 0). Due to the monotonicity properties established in Lemma 5, this would increase utilitarian welfare in every state s.
(c) V * * 2,x (s LH ) ≤ R 2 (k). Proof. The C-RT-C constraints imposed under P i x imply V * * 2,x (s LH ) ≤ V * * 2,x (s LL ) − θ L . Combing this with (b) yields (c).
(d) V * * 1,x (s LL ) = P (V * * 2,x (s LL ), 0) and V * * 1,x (s HL ) = P (V * * 2,x (s HL ), k). Moreover, there is a distortion at the bottom in state s LL .
